Does modularity undermine the pro‐emotion consensus? by Majeed, Raamy
Does Modularity Undermine the Pro-Emotion Consensus?
Raamy Majeed
The University of Auckland
Mind and Language (forthcoming)
ABSTRACT:  There  is  a  growing  consensus  that  emotions  contribute  positively  to 
human practical rationality. While arguments that defend this position often appeal to 
the  modularity  of  emotion-generation  mechanisms,  these  arguments  are  also 
susceptible to the criticism, e.g. by Jones (2006), that emotional modularity supports 
pessimism  about  the  prospects  of  emotions  contributing  positively  to  practical 
rationality here and now. This paper aims to respond to this criticism by demonstrating 
how models of emotion processing can accommodate the sorts of cognitive influence 
required to make the pro-emotion position plausible whilst exhibiting key elements of 
modularity.
KEYWORDS: modularity; information encapsulation;plasticity; emotional rationality; 
frame problem; search hypothesis
Emotions can be either quick or smart, but not both — or so goes the received wisdom. 
Emotions  can  be  quick  when  they  are  triggered  by  modular  emotion-generation 
mechanisms; roughly, mechanisms that are designed, by evolution, to respond to specific 
triggers, and do so whilst ignoring background information, e.g what the agent knows. Or 
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they  can  be  smart,  when  emotion-generation  mechanisms  “learn”  to  respond  to 
environment-specific cues that are beneficial to the agent in their present ecological niche. 
But  it  is  alleged  that  they  cannot  be  both.  In  particular,  any  learning  that  results  in 
response to environment specific problems, it is thought, comes at the expense of speed 
which  is  purchased  through  modular  emotion-generating  mechanisms.  Likewise,  it  is 
assumed that modular mechanisms, by definition, cannot allow for the sorts of cognitive 
influence  required  to  make  emotions  respond  smartly,  i.e.  to  the  ecologically-specific 
problems in which agents can find themselves.
This  tension  in  how  emotions  can  be  both  quick  and  smart  is  wielded  as  an 
objection  against  the  pro-emotion  thesis,  which  presupposes  that  emotions  are  both 
modular  and  play  a  role  in  aiding  reasoning.  It  is  argued,  e.g.  by  Jones  (2006),  that 1
emotional modularity supports pessimism about the prospects of emotions contributing 
positively to practical rationality here and now. This paper aims to meet this criticism by 
demonstrating how models of emotion processing can accommodate the sorts of cognitive 
influence required to make the pro-emotions position plausible whilst exhibiting certain 
hallmarks of modularity. In effect, I shall be arguing that emotions, contrary to current 
wisdom, can be both quick and smart.
In what follows, I explain two possible roles modularity can play in an argument 
for the pro-emotion position (§1), identify and provide an exposition of the objection at the 
!  Advocates of this position include de Sousa (1987), Tooby and Cosmides (1990), Cosmides and 1
Tooby (2000), and Prinz (2004). Note, de Sousa doesn’t commit to emotional modality wholesale, 
but as I shall explain in (§1), he relies on one of its key features, i.e. information encapsulation. 
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very heart of various worries about how modularity may pose a threat to the pro-emotion 
position (§2), and then respond to the objection by exposing some misconceptions which 
give rise to it. In particular, I argue it results from misconceptions about the commitments 
incurred by committing to emotional modularity itself, as well as how characteristics of 
modularity are utilised by the pro-emotion camp (§3). 
1.  The Pro-Emotion Consensus
The  pro-emotion  consensus  derives  from  a  series  of  distinct  views,  from  philosophy, 
psychology and neuroscience, which forgo the view attributed to the Early Moderns, viz. 
that emotions hinder reasoning, for a rival thesis: emotions can, and often do, help with 
reasoning. What emotions exactly are, as well as the precise role emotions play in aiding 
reasoning,  differ  based on the particular theory.  Contemporary definitions of  emotions 
differ on whether emotions, in essence, are feelings, judgements, quasi-perceptual states, 
certain physiological responses, a mixture of these elements etc.  Definitions of emotion on 2
offer by the pro-emotion camp prove no exception. Nevertheless, pro-emotion theorists 
share the assumption that emotions, whatever they are, are the kinds of things which aid 
reasoning. Some even go so far as to define emotions in terms of their capacity to do so, 
which explains why Jones characterises their view of emotions as “evolved capacities that 
are integral to our practical rationality” (pg. 3). For present purposes, we needn’t settle the 
thorny issue of what emotions really are. Instead, it will suffice to take “emotions” as a 
placeholder for the kinds of things which are assumed to aid reasoning by those in the 
 See Deonna and Teroni (2012) for an overview. 2
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pro-emotion camp. In this way, The actual extension of the term will vary depending on 
the particular theory in question.
Pro-emotion theorists also share the assumption that emotions play a role which 
reason cannot. But by the same token, they all tend to agree that emotions play a modest 
role, i.e. they do not solve problems that we cannot solve simply by reasoning. Rather, they 
help us solve these problems when supplemented by reasoning. A view like this is found 
both in the work of de Sousa (1987) and Damasio (1994). These proponents differ on how 
they characterise emotions. Both grant that emotions are evaluative in nature. But for de 
Sousa, emotions are evaluative perceptions or quasi-perceptions, e.g. to be afraid involves 
the perception of danger, whereas for Damasio, emotions are a combination of “mental 
evaluative processes” and dispositional responses to these processes; dispositions directed 
at both the body and the brain (pg. 139). However, the role emotions are said to play in 
their respective theories are remarkably similar. On both views, emotions aid the selection 
of response-options by highlighting some options as relevant whilst  eliminating others 
from consideration.  Pace Damasio,  emotions act  as a “biasing device” (pg.  174),  which 
biases in favour of some response-options. Emotions, then, don’t tell us the exact response-
option we should choose. Instead, they narrow down the search space when choosing the 
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relevant course of action — thus giving these theories the name, “the search hypothesis of 
emotion” (Evans 2002).3
As  Evans  points  out,  the  search  hypothesis  is  best  seen  not  as  a  definition  of 
emotion, but rather an account of what emotions do. Moreover, the hypothesis can only be 
evaluated in the context of a specific theory of what emotions are. Since Damasio and de 
Sousa give differing accounts of what emotions are, a proper assessment of each account 
must, therefore, be done independently. Subsequent assessments have tended to focus on 
Damasio’s version of the hypothesis, exposing ambiguities in how it is to be understood, 
as  well  as  targeting  various  stages  where  emotions  might  be  said  to  affect  decision-
making.  But there is a further complication. Even if we ignore the relevant detail, and 4
speak  very  broadly  about  the  search  hypothesis  by  way of  exposition,  why emotions 
emotions are required for the of selection response-options is not entirely clear,  at least in 
the works of the original proponents of the view. For both Damasio and de Sousa, one of 
 While  there  is  prima facie  reason to  think that  the  search hypothesis  relates  to  the  empirical 3
literature on how emotions might modulate attention, an examination of the connection between 
the two has not been taken up, except by Faucher and Tappolet (2002). Even here, the evidence 
points towards emotional effects on the attention of environmental stimuli,  leaving the precise 
connection between selecting response-options and the phenomenon of attention in need of further 
investigation. See Wu (2014), as well as Mole, Smithies and Wu (2011), for an overview of empirical 
and philosophical notions of attention.
 E.g. see Dunn et al.  (2006), Gerrans (2007), Colombetti (2008), Linquist and Bartol (2013), and 4
Bartol and Linquist (2015).
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the central roles of emotion is to help select the response-options in a quick manner.  But 5
speed for speed’s sake doesn’t suffice to explain the central role emotions play in decision 
making. This has to do with the particular ecological problems in which we find ourselves. 
Some  problems  have  significant  time  constraints.  Being  faced  with  a  mugger,  in  all 
likelihood, requires you to decide pretty quickly whether you should run, handover your 
wallet, display aggression etc. 
Solutions to other ecological problems might not be as urgent, but still require that 
we solve them in a timely manner, especially if such decision-making problems are legion. 
Damasio  provides  the  example  of  his  patient  ‘Eliot’  who has  prefrontal  damage  after 
undergoing surgery, and spends an inordinate amount of time even on making mundane 
decisions, e.g. he laboriously weighs the pros and cons of deciding when to make their 
next  appointment.  Since  such  response-option  selections  are  a  crucial  feature  of  our 
present ecological setting, a lack of emotion-driven reasoning is said to impact our ability 
to make decisions in an efficient manner. But given that most, if not a lot of, decision-
making  procedures  will  be  affected  by  an  absence  of  emotional  aids,  this  will,  quite 
 As Linquist and Bartol (2013) point out, Damasio’s body of work doesn’t lend itself to a coherent 5
position. For instance, in contrast to Damasio (1994), Damasio (1996) stresses the importance of 
emotion  for  both  the  speed  and  the  accuracy  of  making  decisions,  whereas  in  Bechara  and 
Damasio (2005), speed is omitted, while a discussion of accuracy takes centre stage. By contrast, 
though  speed  is  a  constant  factor  in  decision-making  for  de  Sousa,  elsewhere  (AUTHOR: 
forthcoming) I stress the importance of de Sousa’s encapsulated emotion-generating systems in 
also  ensuring that  our  emotion-driven choice-selections  are  not  overridden by what  the  agent 
knows.
!6
plausibly, have an impact on our qualify of life. Eliot, for instance, was unable to gain 
regular  employment  because  he  had significant  time-management  difficulties  at  work. 
Timely decision making on this  account,  then,  is  required not  only to solve particular 
ecological problems, but the cumulative problem we face when we are confronted with 
such particular problems on a regular basis. This additional feature, though not explicit, is 
implied by Damasio’s discussion.
A distinct, though related, account of why emotion-driven reasoning is required is 
fleshed out by de Sousa. For him, emotions help solve a version of the frame problem:
Assume  all  the  powers  already  listed  —  logic,  induction,  and  more-than-encyclopaedic 
knowledge: the philosophers’ frame problem, roughly, is how we make use of just what we need 
from this vast store, how not to retrieve what we don’t need. (de Sousa 1987: 193)
On this account, the kinds of information that could bear on a particular response-option 
selection is so vast that it would be practically impossible to solve the problem simply by 
laboriously considering each piece of information as to whether it is relevant, and then 
additionally reasoning about which pieces of the relevant information are more relevant to 
the particular problem. Emotions, on this version of the problem, “spare us the paralysis 
potentially  induced  by  this  predicament”  (de  Sousa,  pg.  172).  This  differs  from  the 
previous account because not only are emotions required for solving urgent ecological 
problems, and the cumulative problem brought on by less urgent ones. Rather, for any 
given decision-making procedure, there is too much potentially relevant information, and 
lets not forget potentially relevant inferences to draw, such that it would be practically 
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impossible for the agent to solve this problem without an efficient means to narrow the 
search space. 
The original frame problem, of course, is an altogether different problem in artificial 
intelligence,  but  the  philosophers’  frame  problem  bears  a  loose  resemblance.  Both 
problems are problems about how to restrict the amount of information to be computed. In 
the latter case, it is the problem of how to restrict information, including the inferences to 
be drawn, in order to select an appropriate response-option. If the information we have 
indeed is vast, and the inferences we can draw near infinite, solving the frame problem 
would be practically impossible. We do, however, solve the frame problem. Emotions are 
utilised  as  an  explanation  of  how  we  do  so.  Emotions,  pace  de  Sousa,  determine  the 
“salience” of features of reasoning, by circumscribing our practical and cognitive options. 
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In other words, emotions pre-select certain pieces of information as relevant, and thereby 
narrow our search space.6
Though de  Sousa’s  version  of  the  search  hypothesis  is  often  run  together  with 
Damasio’s, the problems they discuss are importantly different. The problems discussed 
by Damasio remain unresolved in a timely and efficient manner except via emotional aids, 
whereas de Sousa’s problems are computationally intractable without emotions coming to 
the rescue. That said, in both cases, time constraints feature in an explanation as to why 
the problems are practically impossible to solve. Moreover, crucially, in both cases, speed 
is  purchased in virtue of  how emotions aid reasoning.  Elements of  modularity feature 
precisely in an explanation of how emotions perform this function. 
 As  in  Damasio’s  hypothesis,  the  exact  stage(s)  of  decision-making which de Sousa thinks  is 6
influenced by emotion remains somewhat opaque.  At an initial  glance,  for both de Sousa and 
Damasio, emotions affect what Linquist and Bartol (2013) identify as “core” stages of decision-
making,  viz.  “option  generation”,  where  a  subject  considers  a  range  of  response-options,  and 
“deliberation", where they consider the consequences of these options. Linquist and Bartol draw 
on empirical evidence to challenge this picture. But on a positive note, they also show that the 
evidence helps explain how emotions might play a role in “peripheral” stages of decision-making. 
In particular,  in “decision-point recognition”,  where a subject  diverts activity away from other 
activities  to  decision-making,  and  “execution”,  where  a  subject  follows  through  with  their 
decision.  These might prove relevant to how emotions help solve some present-day ecological 
problems. The growing empirical literature on how emotions modulate attention, as discussed by 
Faucher and Tappolet (2002), is likewise suggestive. 
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Conceptions  of  modularity  diverge  on  what  is  essential  for  an  information 
processing  system  to  be  modular.  Fodor  (1983),  who  de  Sousa  draws  on,  takes  the 
“essence” of modularity to be constituted by the property of a processing system being 
informationally  encapsulated.  Very  roughly,  a  system  is  informationally  encapsulated 
when the function it computes is insensitive to information stored outside the module. de 
Sousa does not commit to emotional modularity wholesale. However, he takes information 
encapsulation to  be  a  necessary feature  of  how emotions help solve the  philosophers’ 
frame problem.  More accurately, he proposes that “the role of emotions is to supply the 
insufficiency of reason by imitating the encapsulation of perceptual modes” (1987: 195). 
Exactly how information encapsulation helps here needs some unpacking. 
According to Fodor, frame problems don’t arise for informationally encapsulated 
systems because there is only a small amount of information over which to compute. de 
Sousa’s  proposed solution operates under this  principle.  The vast  store of  information 
with  which  we  are  possessed  creates  a  frame problem when we attempt  to  select  an 
appropriate  response-option.  Emotional  processing,  when  encapsulated  or  “imitating” 
encapsulation, occurs without considering this vast store of information. Such processing, 
consequently,  is  quick, but more importantly,  it  manages to highlight certain response-
options as relevant for consideration whilst eliminating others. Thus such processing, in 
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effect,  limits  the  range  of  response-options  we  need  to  consider,  and  thereby  makes 
selecting a response-option a practically tractable problem.  7
While de Sousa and Damasio’s pro-emotion theses are run together, an essential 
property  of  modulatory  features  in  the  former’s  proposal,  whereas  no  such  property 
features  in  the  latter.  However,  information  encapsulation  also  bears  on  Damasio’s 
problems. Some ecological problems we face come with significant time constraints, and 
the speed which is purchased by encapsulated processing systems ensures that we can 
emotionally respond to such situations in a quick and efficient manner. The fear responses 
triggered when faced with a mugger biases in favour of  certain response-options (e.g. 
submission) over others (e.g. aggression). Likewise, the cumulative problem is minimised 
so  long  as  some  particular  decision-making  problems  are  resolved  as  a  product  of 
encapsulated emotion-generation systems. 
The difference in the proposed contribution made by information encapsulation to 
the pro-emotion hypotheses is whether encapsulated emotional processing is practically 
useful or necessary to solve the problems we face. As I read Damasio, encapsulation is 
 See Ransom (2016) for a critique. Note, a central worry here is that emotions can’t help solve the 7
frame  problem  because  “rigid,  reflex-like”  mechanisms  would  fail  to  manifest  the  kinds  of 
intelligence required to identify content-sensitive factors embedded in real-life frame problems. 
Part of addressing this worry, I take it, involves explaining how automatic, reflex-like emotion-
generating mechanisms can accommodate the kinds of cognitive influence required to account for 
context. This is taken up in section 3.    
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necessary to solve some particular  ecological  problems,  though not  all.  (Nevertheless, 8
there  is  a  case  to  be  made that  encapsulation  is  required to  minimise  the  cumulative 
problem). In contrast, for de Sousa, encapsulation is necessary to solve all instances of the 
philosophers’ frame problem. This is because for any given instance of the problem, there 
is  simply  too  much  information  we  possess  which  might  be  relevant;  and  too  many 
inferences we can draw from them. 
The overall point to draw from this discussion is this: the role attributed to modular 
emotion generating mechanisms by the pro-emotion camp depends on precisely how they 
understand the relevant decision-making problems. According to some conceptions of the 
problems,  it  plays  an  indispensable  role,  while  on  others,  it  plays  inessential,  though 
incredibly  useful,  role.  How  much  modularity  could  undermine  the  pro-emotion 
consensus will, then, depend on which particular pro-emotion position we take as a target. 
However,  if  modularity does prove to be a legitimate threat,  there is enough of a link 
between conceptions of modularity and pro-emotion hypotheses to make it a serious cause 
for concern for advocates of the pro-emotion camp. 
 Again,  as  Linquist  and  Bartol  (2013)  point  out,  the  need  for  emotions  —  encapsulated  or 8
otherwise — is not consistent through out Damasio’s work. Damasio (1994: 193), as well as Bechara 
and Damasio (2005: 339), take emotions to be necessary for decision-making, whereas Damasio 
(1994: chapter 3; 1996) suggests otherwise.
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2.  The Objection
Modularity, as we saw, can feature in an explanation of how emotions aid reasoning. In 
this regard, it remains a tool in the pro-emotion theorist’s toolkit. Modularity, however, has 
also been employed to explain how emotions can be irrational. Griffiths (1997) employs 
modular emotion-generation mechanisms, which are quick and automatic, to explain how 
emotions can occur without the process of belief-fixation which gives rise to judgement. 
This  is  supposed  to  explain  irrational  emotional  episodes  where  we  get  the  relevant 
emotions  sans  the  relevant  beliefs,  e.g.  fearing  flying  without  judging  it  to  be  unsafe. 
Moreover,  modularity  not  only  helps  explain  irrational  emotions,  but  it  has  also  been 
argued more recently, e.g. by Jones, that it undermines the pro-emotion position. The crux 
of Jone’s criticism is that modularity, if anything, supports pessimism about the prospects 
of emotions contributing positively to practical rationality here and now.
The threat posed by modularity for our current ability to reason has been outlined 
in different ways,  though I  shall  now argue they point to the same underlying worry. 
Those who argue for emotional modularity suppose that emotions are adaptations, which 
enable  us  to  respond  quickly  to  practical  problems  posed  by  our  natural  and  social 
environments. For example, emotions are designed, by evolution, to respond to a certain 
class of stimuli. However, as Deonna and Teroni note, “the very existence of classes of 
stimuli  for  any given type of  emotion is  in  itself  questionable.  Trotting out  shopworn 
examples of snakes and spiders to delineate the class of stimuli relevant in the case of the 
fear affect program is often the best we can do in employing this strategy” (2012: 26). There 
are at least two worries here, only of which is really relevant to the threat. First, the set of 
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examples  those  in  the  modularity  camp  offer  as  examples  of  quick  fitness-enhancing 
emotional responses are limited. This, primarily, is a threat to the view that emotions are 
modular more generally, as opposed to a threat posed by modularity to the pro-emotion 
thesis. It makes us doubt that there are such responses designed by evolution, especially 
for each emotion type. Behind this worry, however, lies a second worry more germane for 
our purpose. That is, given the nature of the examples trotted, not just their sheer scarcity, 
it remains doubtful that modular emotional responses, even if they exist, are relevant for 
practical rationality in our present environment. Put in another way, why suppose that 
adaptations to the Pleistocene environment of our ancestors have any fitness-enhancing 
value for 21st Century dwellers like us? If they are such useful adaptions, e.g. an “innate” 
fear of snakes, they seem to be limited, and certainly cannot do the work posed by pro-
emotion theorists, like Damasio and de Sousa, in terms of aiding decision-making.
There is an even more forceful objection in the vicinity, which is owing to Jones. 
That is, pace Sterelny (2003), modular mechanisms would be unlikely to provide veridical 
solutions to problems that require complex situation specific cues for their solution To 
elaborate, many problems we face in our present environment are “open problems” that 
require a nuanced understanding of the particular environments in which they occur for 
us to solve them in an adequate manner. So what is required is for there to be a cognitively 
modifiable range of triggering properties. That is, we need our emotional responses to be 
triggered not just  by properties that  proved relevant for our Pleistocene ancestors.  We 
need  quick  and  automatic  responses  to  properties  that  prove  relevant  in  our  present 
environment, including our social niches.   
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Problem-solving within a  social  setting is  especially  pertinent  when it  comes to 
explaining the need for cognitive modifications. We may learn from past experiences “off-
line”  without  recourse  to  anything  like  cognitive  input.  In  such  cases,  emotional 
processing systems benefit from a modified set of trigging properties, though not ones that 
are modified in any way that resembles high-level cognition. Sterelny, however, assumes 
that our social environments are inherently dynamic, which in turn means that simple 
stimulus-response mechanisms will prove ineffective when it comes to solving problems 
that arise in such environments. Judgements of infidelity, for example, only prove effective 
when  implemented  as  cognitive  tasks.  Running  with  this  example,  Jones  notes  that 
jealousy is triggered not just by the mere smell of perfume or an awareness that one’s 
partner is again late from work, but once these factors are “seen as” evidence of possible 
infidelity (pg. 21). 
The need for a cognitively modifiable range of triggering properties  is certainly not 
neglected by the pro-emotion camp. For de Sousa, the objects that can trigger emotional 
responses are learnt during “paradigm scenarios” drawn from early life as children but 
reinforced by culture. Likewise, according to Damasio, the mental images that can trigger 
our  emotional  responses  can  be  acquired  as  opposed  to  being  innate.  The  problem, 9
however,  is  that  such  cognitive  modifications  appear  to  be  in  tension  with  emotional 
modularity. One of the hallmarks of modularity is information encapsulation. If modular 
emotion generating mechanisms are thus encapsulated, it seems by definition, they will 
 Note, these images needn’t be visual, they can be auditory, olfactory etc. (see pgs. 84-89).9
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turn  out  to  be  insensitive  to  the  kinds  of  cognitive  modifications  that  may  be  learnt 
through the developmental stages of an agent’s lifespan.
There  are,  then,  two  objections.  First,  insofar  as  emotions  help  with  decision 
making, they can do so only in a limited range of situations; situations that call for quick 
solutions to “closed problems”, which don’t require additional input during the lifespan of 
the  organism  for  their  solution.  Second,  emotions  can’t  help  with  decision-making 
problems  which  are  open  problems;  problems  that  require  additional  input,  e.g. 
cognitively modifiable triggering properties,  for their solution. These objections are not 
only  compatible  but  can  be  viewed  as  differing  viewpoints  on  the  same  underlying 
scepticism about the prospects of modular emotion-generating mechanisms being useful 
for  decision-making problems we presently  face.  Moreover,  they result  from the same 
source, viz. a tension between emotional modularity and the kinds of cognitive influence 
required  to  resolve  our  present  decision-making  problems.  The  overall  objection  is 
summed up by Jones:
Far from grounding an easy inference to a pro-emotion position, positing emotions as evolved 
modules designed to help constrained and ecologically situated agents respond quickly and 
reliably to their environment tends to support pessimism about their prospects for contributing 
positively to practical rationality here and now. (Jones 2006: 25) 
This  objection helps us re-articulate  our starting dilemma. Some problems require fast 
decision-making solutions, and a possible way this is achieved is if emotions both help 
with response-option selections and do so in a quick manner. A possible explanation for 
why  they  can  be  quick  is  that  they  are  brought  on  by  modular  emotion-generation 
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mechanisms; or at least mechanisms that are informationally encapsulated. However, for 
emotions to prove useful to decision making in our present environment, i.e. for them to 
legitimately count as smart, they need to allow for the sorts of cognitive influence ruled 
out  by  emotion-generating  mechanisms  being  informationally  encapsulated.  It  would, 
then, appear that emotions can be quick or smart, but not both. 
The threat this dilemma actually poses to the pro-emotion position depends on the 
specific roles modularity plays in the pro-emotion views. Previously we looked at two 
examples; examples which by no means exhaust the kinds of pro-emotion views in the 
literature. For de Sousa, a key feature of modularity, viz. information encapsulation, helps 
prevent real-life decision making problems from being frame problems. Decision-making 
is  not  only  quick  but  practically  possible  only  because  emotional  processing  is 
informationally encapsulated. Subsequently, insofar as real-life decision making problems 
require  cognitive  modifications  for  their  adequate  solution,  encapsulated  emotion-
generation  mechanisms  would  fail  to  solve  them.  But  by  the  same  token,  if  such 
mechanisms  are  un-encapsulated,  de  Sousa’s  theory  predicts  that  the  decision-making 
problems will become computationally intractable frame problems which are unsolvable. 
So the tension between modularity and how emotions can solve open decision-making 
problems,  unless  resolved,  would  undermine  de  Sousa’s  position.  This  is  because  the 
tension predicts that on either option, emotions can’t help solve practical decision-making 
problems which arise in our present ecological niche. 
The situation is not as dire for Damasio. As discussed, Damasio doesn’t appeal to 
modularity  to  argue  for  his  pro-emotion  position.  Nevertheless,  as  we  also  saw, 
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modularity  bolsters  this  position  by  providing  an  explanation  of  how  emotional 
processing can deliver quick response-option selections,  which are required to solve at 
least  some  decision-making  problems,  and  moreover  help  minimise  the  cumulative 
problem posed by having to solve less urgent, but still time-constrained, decision-making 
problems on a regular basis. Given that modularity is not essential to decision-making on 
this picture, the role that emotions can play in aiding reasoning is not entirely undermined 
by the aforementioned tension. Nevertheless, it is limited in crucial respects. 
If  most  decision  making  problems  are  open,  solving  them  would  require  un-
encapsulated  emotion  generating  mechanisms,  which  in  effect  would  fail  to  solve  the 
really urgent decision-making problems, like what to do when faced with a mugger. The 
decision-making problems that Damasio discusses, e.g. those that confront Eliot, however, 
are less urgent, so it doesn’t seem like the problems targeted by emotion-driven reasoning 
on this picture would be affected by a failure of emotional modularity. That said, there 
remains the issue of the cumulative problem. If less urgent decision-making problems are 
solved by taking the maximal amount of time required to solve them, e.g. as in the case of 
Eliot, this would prove incredibly ineffective, and have significant ramifications for the 
agent’s quality of life. Thus forgoing modular emotion-generation mechanisms still come 
with significant costs; costs that don’t really work as a knockdown objection to Damasio’s 
pro-emotion view, but prove significant enough to considerably limit its scope. 
The pro-emotion position is,  thereby,  found to stand on shaky ground. But it  is 
important to be clear on which point of the explanation is threatened by a commitment to 
modularity.  The  search  hypothesis  of  emotion  is  a  view  which,  in  essence,  stands 
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independent of any claims about emotional modularity.  It’s key claim is that emotions 
assist  reasoning by highlighting some response-options  whilst  eliminating others  from 
consideration. This is achieved not by emotions being in any way modular, but rather by 
their affective components. In brief, emotions have valences: they feel good or bad; they 
are positive or negative. In virtue of this, they are capable of representing what they are 
responses  to  as  also  being  positive  or  negative.  This  allows  response-options  which 10
provoke  a  positive  or  negative  emotional  response  to  be  highlighted.  Moreover,  they 
enable us to eliminate the options that elicit negative responses while shoeing in on the 
ones that elicit positive responses.  11
Modularity enters the picture in terms of how this is executed. More precisely, the 
mechanisms which elicit emotion responses being modular enables these responses to be 
quick; it allows for response-options to be selected in a quick and efficient manner. What is 
threatened by the tension between modularity and the cognitive influence required for 
practical  rationality  is  not  any  key  claims  of  the  search  hypothesis  per  se.  Rather, 
modularity threatens its execution. The tension tells us that the architecture of the human 
mind is such that we don’t have the mechanisms that enable the search hypothesis to be 
 To paraphrase Colombetti (2005), this is to suppose that ‘object valence’ (the positive or negative 10
charge  of  objects  in  the  environment)  is  parasitic  on  ‘affective  valence’  (how good or  bad an 
emotion feels).  For  Damasio (2003),  affective valences,  in  turn,  are  dependent  on whether  our 
organismic  processes  are  optimal  and  non-obstructed  (positive)  or  impeded  (negative).  See 
Colombetti for an exposition of this and rival accounts of valence. 
 This is explicit in Damasio (1994). See Author (forthcoming) for an exposition of precisely how 11
affective components and information encapsulation feature in de Sousa’s proposal.
!19
implemented. Those in the pro-emotion camp owe us a plausible story about how the 
search hypothesis works in practice. As it stands, the tension tells against any such account 
being forthcoming.
3.  Modularity and Cognitive Influence 
The pro-emotion position is threatened because emotional modularity, which pro-emotion 
theorists  utilise  to  explain  how  emotions  contribute  to  decision-making,  appears 
incompatible with the sorts of cognitive influence required to explain how we resolve real-
life  decision making problems.  There  are  two possible  courses  of  response:  reject  that 
cognitive modifications are required to solve problems we face in our present ecological 
niche, or explain how the perceived incompatibility is just that; perceived as opposed to 
actual. 
While the first of these responses isn’t a non-starter, it would be ill-advised to take it 
for  a  plethora of  different  reasons.  First,  prima face,  it  is  plausible that  we emotionally 
respond  to  stimuli  which  we  aren’t  designed  to  by  evolution.  There  are  countless 
examples: responding anxiously to the sound of your ringtone when you hear it late at 
night, fearing people of particular skin colours, e.g. the tendency of some Americans to 
fear blacks but not other ethnic minorities, and so on. Second, neural plasticity suggests 
that our brains not only develop new neural pathways during our lifetime, but that our 
neural  circuits  can “learn” to be activated by various stimuli.  Neural  architecture,  of 12
 See Stiles, Reilly, Levine et al. (2012) for an overview.12
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course, can come part from cognitive architecture. However, insofar as cognitive models of 
the mind track our neural ones, this suggests that the cognitive architecture is not rigid, at 
least not in terms of content. This is borne out in the neurobiology emotion generation. 
There is good empirical evidence to suggest that affect-programs, i.e. the coordinated set 
of physiological changes which feature in an emotional response, e.g. autonomic nervous 
system, musculoskeletal and expressive facial changes, can be triggered by content which 
is learnt.  Third, rejecting cognitive influence is a straw-man since even proponents of 13
emotional  modularity  are  explicit  that  modular  emotion  generating  mechanisms  can 
acquire the content to which they respond. For example, Griffiths, one of the champions of 
emotional modularity, notes that “While the structure of the adaptive responses is innate, 
the contents of the system which triggers them are largely learnt” (1990: 175). Finally, as 
critics, e.g. Jones, argue, such cognitive modifications are indeed useful, if not essential, for 
real-life  decision making.  We can’t,  for  instance,  fully utilise  the benefits  of  quick fear 
responses if they can’t be directed at things like oncoming cars, stock market numbers, 
sirens etc. 
These points carry in favour of an altogether different response, i.e. explain how 
emotional  modularity  is  compatible  with  the  sorts  of  cognitive  influence  required  for 
practical  rationality.  But  before  we  proceed,  note  the  puzzle  that  now appears  in  the 
dialectic.  Thus far,  the pro-emotion camp has been criticised for  assuming modularity, 
which  is  said  to  be  incompatible  with  the  forms  of  cognitive  influence  required  for 
 E.g see LeDoux (1996) and Ekman (2003).13
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practical rationality. But as we just saw, proponents of emotional modularity appear to 
grant precisely these forms of cognitive influence. So what is going on?
The worry of a tension is most explicit in Jones. According to her, “a pro-emotion 
position presupposes that emotions are capable of coming to be directed towards new 
objects in virtue of a cognitively modifiable range of triggering properties”, but this “is a 
substantive and controversial assumption, which is in prima facie tension with the claim 
that emotions are modular” (2006: 4). There are two possible sources for this tension, one 
made clear by Jones, the other we have hinted at earlier. Both of these can be defused. Let 
us begin with the second.
As discussed earlier, it is assumed that modular mechanisms, by definition, cannot 
allow for cognitive influence. In particular, insofar as information encapsulation marks the 
essence of modularity, modularity rules out cognitive influence for to be informationally 
encapsulated, by definition, is to be insensitive to information stored outside the modules, 
including  cognitive  information.  This  is  correct  in  terms  of  a  very  broad  picture  of 
modularity.  But  it  needs  some fine-tuning if  we are  to  implement  it  at  a  lower,  more 
detailed  level.  To  start  with,  informationally  encapsulated  processing  systems  are  not 
insensitive to all background information. They are insensitive to information not already 
stored  within  the  module  (Shea  2015).  Informationally  encapsulated  processing,  then, 
doesn't  rule  out  cognitive  influence;  it  just  rules  out  cognitive  influence  from  other 
modules. 
The next step is to determine whether new kinds of information can actually be 
acquired and stored in the emotion-generating modules. Emotional plasticity suggests that 
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emotion  processing  systems  do  acquire  new  content.  Since  this  isn't  ruled  by  a 14
commitment to information encapsulation, ceteris paribus, there is no reason why emotion 
processing can’t be both informationally encapsulated and subject to cognitive information 
acquired during the life-span of an agent. Sterelny (2003) provides an example of how this 
could be so for the content of a lexicon. He is, in particular, interested in spelling out a 
possible way such content can be encapsulated whilst  changing over time and despite 
failing to be innate: “though the database is updated over time, a single time interpretation 
depends  only  on  the  database’s  current  contents.  That  database  does  not  have  to  be 
updated on-line, while grappling with a specific interpretation problem” (pg. 219). 
Sterelny calls this “partial” encapsulation. I think it is more illuminating to make a 
distinction between diachronic vs. synchronic encapsulation.  Information processing is 15
synchronically encapsulated, roughly, when it is insensitive to information presently stored 
outside the module, whereas it is diachronically encapsulated when it is incentive to any 
information stored outside the module simpliciter. On this way of drawing the distinction, 
diachronically  encapsulated  emotion-generation  modules  will  be  insensitive  to  any 
information  acquired  during  the  life-span  of  an  organism,  while  synchronically 
encapsulated  modules  won’t  be  insensitive  in  this  way.  As  discussed,  information 
encapsulation, as conceived in cognitive science, and to the extent to which it is assumed 
  For an overview on emotional plasticity, see Tappolet and Faucher (2007).14
 Here I borrow from the analogous distinction in the cognitive penetrability of perception debate. 15
See Stokes (2013).
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in discussions of modularity in evolutionary biology , commit to processing systems that 16
are only synchronically encapsulated. 
The idea that there is a further commitment to diachronic encapsulation comes from 
misconstruing the commitments of an evolutionary developmental psychology as applied 
to  the  mechanisms  of  emotion  processing.  To  suppose  that  emotions  are,  pace  Jones, 
“clever  design  solutions”,  does  not  incur  a  commitment  to  an  innate,  cognitively 
unmodifiable range of  triggering properties.  As we saw, advocates of  the program are 
explicit  in  granting  that  the  properties  which  trigger  our  emotional  responses  are 
overwhelmingly learnt. Ekman, for instance, notes that, “Our affect-programs are open so 
that we can learn what will work in the particular environment in which we are living, 
and  store  this  information  in  a  way  that  will  allow  it  to  guide  our  behaviour 
automatically” (2003: 67). Likewise, for Griffiths:
The local events which possess the properties of being dangerous, noxious or novel may be 
very different from one environment to the other. If affect-programs are to be of significant 
adaptive advantage to an organism over an evolutionarily significant time period, it would be 
advantageous  for  them  to  be  linked  to  some  mechanism  which  can  interpret  the  broad 
ecological categories of danger, novelty and so forth, in the light of local conditions, and equate 
them  with  detectable  features  of  the  local  environment.  So  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that 
organisms have to learn which events in their particular environment should trigger the affect-
programs. (1990: 184)
  Contrary to notions of modularity we get from cognitive science, e.g. Fodor, domain-specificity, 16
as  opposed  to  information  encapsulation,  is  regarded  as  the  hallmark  of  modality  for 
developmental biologists, e.g. Pinker (1997). 
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Affect-programs are typically understood as modular. They are said to be generated by 
mechanisms that are encapsulated. But they are also understood as being open in that they 
allow  for  information  about  the  local  environment  to  be  acquired  and  stored  in  the 
emotion-generating  modules.  The  prima  facie  tension,  then,  is  misplaced.  Information 
encapsulation doesn’t, as a matter of definition, rule out cognitive influence. Not only that; 
proponents  of  emotional  modularity  seem  to  be  overwhelmingly  committed  to  such 
influence. 
The second source of  tension gets  more traction.  Pace  Jones,  here the tension is 
owing to it being an open question whether there are any theoretically acceptable notions 
of modularity which allow for the kinds of cognitive influence required to make the pro-
emotion  position  plausible.  As  noted,  there  are  theoretically  acceptable  notions  of 
modularity that allow for cognitive influence. However, whether they can accommodate 
the  kinds  of  influence  which  make  a  pro-emotion  position  plausible  is  an  altogether 
different matter. This depends on the precise role modularity plays in an argument for the 
pro-emotion position. As we saw, a central role it plays is not in telling us which response-
options  to  consider,  but  in  telling  us  which  ones  to  consider  in  a  quick  and efficient 
manner. Emotion processing systems being synchronically encapsulated suffices for this 
role. 
On de  Sousa’s  picture,  emotions  “imitate”  the  encapsulation of  perception,  and 
thereby solve the philosophers’ frame problem: roughly the problem of figuring out which 
information  is  relevant  for  a  particular  response-option  and  to  avoid  considering 
irrelevant information. The claim about “imitation” is imprecise, and can be criticised for 
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being  more  conjectural  than  an  empirically  tractable  hypothesis  we  can  scrutinise. 
Conjecture or not, multi-pathway models of emotion-generation provide plausible ways of 
fleshing out de Sousa’s thesis. According to Griffiths (1997), what we call “emotions” can 
be generated either  through appraisal  mechanisms that  are  “cognitively impenetrable” 
and deliver responses quickly and automatically, and are thereby more or less modular, or 
mechanisms  that  are  cognitively  penetrable,  and  generate  responses  in  a  slow  and 
considered fashion.17
An implementation of  this  model  is  found in the twin-pathway neurobiological 
account of emotion generation for fear proposed by LeDoux (1996). On this account, two 
distinct  “emotion  circuits”  are  involved  in  fear  responses:  roughly,  (i)  a  thalamus-to-
amygdala circuit, which bypasses the cortex, is “quick and dirty”, and occurs without the 
conscious experience of  the stimulus,  and (ii)  a  thalamus-to-cortex-to-amygdala circuit, 
which is slow, and occurs with the conscious experience of the stimulus. Circuit (i) allows 
for  the rapid response to threatening situations,  which is  needed for survival,  and (ii) 
ensures a detailed evaluation of the emotional significance of the situation such that we 
can respond in the most appropriate way.18
Applying this to de Sousa’s version of the search hypothesis, emotions can be said 
to  “imitate”  the  encapsulation  of  perception  when  they  are  generated  by  cognitively 
impenetrable  emotion-generation  mechanisms.  The  question  is,  are  these  mechanisms 
  In this context, cognitively penetrable emotion generating systemsare systems that fail to be 17
informationally encapsulated.
 See Teasdale (1999) for a discussion of various multi-level theories of emotion generation.18
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encapsulated diachronically as well as synchronically? The role emotions play in solving, 
or rather avoiding, real-life frame problems can be performed even if emotions turn out to 
be only synchronically encapsulated. At least, this is what de Sousa himself supposes since 
he  allows  for  the  contents  which  trigger  emotional  responses  to  be  learnt  through 
paradigm scenarios. There is also good reason to think that this supposition is correct. 
Emotions can control for the salience of features of reasoning even when which pieces of 
information it deems relevant at any given moment is learnt within the life-span of the 
agent. What is required to avoid real-life frame problems are biasing mechanisms that can 
highlight pieces of emotion in a timely and efficient way. This can be achieved even if 
some of these biases have to be acquired. As Griffiths warns, “the issue of whether affect-
programs  exist  must  not  be  confused  with  the  issue  of  whether  they  are  innate.  In 
principle, an affect-program may be entirely innate, entirely learnt, or a  mixture of the 
two.  These  are  questions  about  how  the  circuitry  gets  built,  not  about  whether  it 
exists”  (1990:180).  What  matters  for  emotions  to  fulfil  their  “biological  function”  of 
determining the salience of information on de Sousa’s theory is the existence of biasing 
mechanisms that generate emotional responses roughly along the lines of affect-programs. 
Such programs, as we saw, accommodate cognitive influence.
As for the search hypothesis proposed by Damasio, emotions are required to solve 
decision-making problems with significant time-constraints and the cumulative problem 
we  face  when  we  are  confronted  by  decision-making  problems,  both  urgent  and  less 
urgent, on a regular basis. Modularity, as we saw, is not explicitly discussed as part of this 
project, but can play a role in explaining both how decision-making can be quick for the 
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problems that require urgent responses, and how the cumulative problem can be resolved, 
if not minimised, when we have emotion processing systems that deliver response-options 
quickly  and  automatically.  Again,  these  roles  can  be  occupied  even  if  our  emotion 
generating  systems  are  only  synchronically  encapsulated.  Take  Eliot.  Synchronically 
encapsulated emotion generation mechanisms would suffice for Eliot to make decisions, 
like when to book his next appointment, in an effective and timely fashion so as not to 
jeopardise his plans for the day. 
Synchronically encapsulated systems do have limitations. We addressed the worry 
earlier,  owing  to  Sterelny,  that  modular  mechanisms  would  be  unlikely  to  provide 
veridical  solutions  to  problems  that  require  complex  situation  specific  cues  for  their 
solution. But there is an ambiguity here in how we are to understand such cues. On one 
reading, namely the earlier one, the cues we need to take to into account are those that can 
be acquired within the lifespan of the agent. Perhaps they are acquired during key stages 
of development, e.g. in something akin to paradigm scenarios. But they needn’t be. They 
may  be  acquired  at  any  given  stage  provided  they  are  prior  to  the  decision-making 
problem in question, and are acquired early on and frequently enough for a sensitivity to 
these cues to be stored in one or more of the emotion processing modules. So long as 
situation  specific  cues  are  ones  to  which  we  can  be  thus  sensitive,  modular,  i.e. 
synchronically  encapsulated,  emotion-generation  mechanisms  may  suffice  to  solve  the 
relevant decision problems.
On  a  different  reading,  situation  specific  cues  are  cues  indexed  to  the  specific 
decision-making problem we face. Put another way, the problem is novel with regards to 
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at least some of the information required to solve it. On this reading, given the very nature 
of the problem, background information already stored within the module won’t suffice to 
deliver a vertical solution. The situation specific cues need to be taken into account, stored, 
and thought over alongside whatever else the agent knows, for us to solve such problems. 
Synchronically encapsulated information processing systems, subsequently,  won’t  solve 
them. What we require are non-modular emotion generation mechanisms which fully take 
into account all of the cues specific to that particular problem. In this case speed will be 
sacrificed for the deliberation required to solve it. 
This is a limitation of modular emotion-generation mechanisms. They cannot assist 
solve open problems that are genuinely novel. However, it is a limitation that those in the 
pro-emotion camp should,  and appear  to,  accept.  The fact  that  we have two or  more 
emotion-generating systems speaks to the need to solve both kinds of problems. Theories 
of emotional modularity accommodate this because they tend to be dual or multi-pathway 
models  of  emotion  generation.  Since  those  in  the  pro-emotion  camp  draw  on  these 
theories, we need a more careful reading of the kinds of decision-making problems they 
think are solved with the assistance of emotion-driven reasoning. Emotions are helpful 
biasing devices that bias us in favour of some response-options and against others. Biases, 
however, have limitations. They error precisely when they are exceptions to the rule; when 
we are exposed to genuine novelty. But such novelty, though pervasive, is by no means the 
norm. The ecological problems we face are often novel, but they also often fail to be so.  
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An inability to deliver veridical solutions to such problems, then, in no way undermines 
the work emotions can do in helping solve both open and closed problems — where there 
is at least some prior precedent set for the kinds of information required to solve them.
Here we would be remise not to mention recent work by Sterelny (2012), which 
helps illuminate the present dialectic. In a chapter entitled “The Challenge of Novelty”, 
Sterelny critiques modular accounts of the mind more broadly, and does so on the basis of 
the increasing complexities of our social world. Moreover, his subsequent aim is to explain 
the  role  of  cultural  learning  in  human evolution,  including  how such  learning  solves 
problems which are (allegedly)  too difficult  for  modular  systems.  This  project,  despite 
appearances, is compatible with the picture presented above. The issue hangs as much on 
what he means by novelty, as on the target of his critique. In footnote 4, he makes the 
following  clarification:  “By  novel,  I  mean  “evolutionarily  novel”;  I  do  not  mean  an 
individual’s first experience of a particular challenge. Obviously, prior experience leading 
to  learning  is  often  essential  to  adaptive  response”  (2012:  199).  Sterelny,  then,  readily 
accepts that mechanisms can have adaptive responses that are learnt within the lifespan of 
an organism. Subsequently, the target of his critique is not really synchronic modules but 
diachronic  ones;  modules  which are  pre-programmed to trigger  in  response to  special 
innately-specified triggering properties. Diachronically flexible modules, as we saw, will 
still prove ineffective in response to situations which are genuinely novel to the agent in 
question. But crucially, this is not the challenge of novelty which Sterelny poses for an 
account of innate modularity. Much more, granted, needs to be said by way of explaining 
precisely how diachronically flexible modules, made use of by the pro-emotion camp, can 
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feature in a Sterelny-style story, which stresses the significance of socio-cultural learning in 
hominin evolution. Nevertheless, as things stand, we find no real tension between the two 
programs. 
In  this  paper,  my strategy has  been to  diffuse  the  objection to  the  pro-emotion 
consensus by showing that models of modularity can accommodate cognitive influence of 
the sort often required for practical rationality. Nevertheless, if we are to defend the pro-
emotion program in this way, its future success will, in part, depend on our ability to flesh 
this  out.  The  challenge  posed  by  the  dynamic  nature  of  our  social  environments,  in 
particular,  puts  pressure  on  providing  an  explanation  of  precisely  how  synchronic 
encapsulation  can  give  way  to  diachronic  flexibility,  i.e.  of  the  sort  required  to  solve 
decision-making problems in such environments. This is a substantial task, one best left 
for another day. But let me end by making some very tentative preliminary remarks about 
how such an explanation might go at the computational level.
The task of explaining flexibility to context is a broader problem for any account of 
modularity;  not just for ones to do with emotion-processing. This problem has proved 
especially  cumbersome for  accounts  of  massive modularity,  which hold that  the  mind 
consists of many modules which exist and operate, more or less, independently of one 
another.  One possible  explanation of  how such an account  can accommodate  context-
flexibility  has  to  do with  competition amongst  the  modules.  Drawing on the  work of 
Sperber (2005), Carruthers (2006) suggests the following picture: 
Different modules are cued by different features of the environment — social, physical, animal, 
vegetable etc. — and at various levels of abstractness (e.g. suddenly moving stimuli and loud 
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noises verses cheater detection). All, when activated, compete with one another for resources, 
and to get outputs entry into downstream inferential and decision-making systems. But how 
this competition pans out in a given case might often be highly be sensitive to the details of the 
context (both environmental and cognitive), and also to the learning history of the person in 
question. (Carruthers 2006: 219)
Carruthers here is operating on a much less restrictive account of modularity than the one 
proposed in this paper. However, we needn’t commit to it, nor the massive modularity 
hypothesis, to make use of the basic idea. 
Suppose that even within the scope of a twin or multi-pathway model of emotion-
generation, each “module” that makes up a given emotion-processing pathway comprises 
of  two  or  more  separate  modules.  Say  this  holds  for  the  “quick  and  dirty”  emotion-
generating  pathways,  as  well  as  the  ones  that  are  slower  and  involve  conscious 
deliberation. Out of the modules that comprise the quick emotion-generation pathways, 
some of them may encode (cognitive) information specific to certain contexts, while others 
might fail to do so. Crucially, none of the modules that feature in this quick pathway will 
be sensitive to information stored outside any of the modules associated with it, which 
means the synchronically encapsulated nature of the overall pathway will be preserved. 
Nevertheless,  synchronic  encapsulation can give rise  to diachronic  flexibility when the 
activation of the pathway involves the activation of one of the modules which happens to 
store information relevant to the particular context. 
I can only speculate as to how this is implemented at the neural-level. But let me do 
so, regardless, as it helps make the point clearer. According to LeDoux, the “quick and 
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dirty”  emotion  circuit  for  fear  is  a  thalamus-to-amygdala  circuit,  which  bypasses  the 
cortex,  and  occurs  without  the  conscious  experience  of  the  stimulus.  Recent  work  by 
LeDoux (2016) suggests, however, that at a more fine-grained level, this pathway might 
actually  comprise  of  several  distinct  emotion  circuits,  some  of  which  activate  the 
hippocampus;  the  region  of  the  emotional  brain  that  encodes  context-sensitive 
information. On such a picture, how synchronically encapsulated modules give way to 
diachronic flexibility can be explained, roughly, as follows. A quick and dirty emotion-
processing circuit is diachronically flexible when it features modules that incorporate the 
hippocampus, and thereby take certain context-sensitive cues into account, whereas it fails 
to be thus flexible when it only features modules that bypass the hippocampus. Nowhere 
in  this  picture  is  there  a  guarantee  of  diachronic  flexibility  being  manifest  in  every 
instance. But pace  Sperber and Carruthers,  it  is  plausible that competition amongst the 
modules is  often won by modules that  encode information relevant  to the contexts  in 
question.
Sperber himself grants the speculative nature of his proposal, and concedes that it 
“calls for both greater empirical anchoring and for formal modeling” (pg. 68). I end by 
making  the  very  same concession  here  regarding  the  details  of  diachronically  flexible 
emotion-generating modules.
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4.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, the scope of this paper is modest. It does not seek to establish that emotions 
actually  aid  reasoning.  Rather,  it  argues  that  widespread  assumptions  about  the 
incompatibility of modularity and emotion-driven reasoning are misplaced and rest on 
misconceptions about the commitments incurred by committing to emotional modularity, 
as well as how characteristics of modularity are utilised by the pro-emotion camp. As we 
saw,  pro-emotion  theorists  can  accommodate  cognitive  modifications  to  emotion 
processing of the sort required to solve certain ecologically specific problems whilst still 
allowing this  processing to be modular in key respects.  An integral  part  of  this  is  the 
recognition that pro-emotion theorists are, and need be, only committed to modules which 
are  synchronically  encapsulated:  modules  that  are  insensitive  to  information  presently 
stored outside the module, but which allow for various kinds of diachronic updating. I 
don’t think the fault here lies squarely with the opponent. To the extent to which pro-
emotion  theorists  employ  notions  like  ‘modularity’,  the  precise  sense  in  which  these 
notions are employed, as well as the exact work they are put towards, are often obscured. 
In  this  paper,  I  have  aimed  to  clarify  these  issues  and  thereby  remedy  the  present 
confusion. Doing so helps us see more clearly why modularity doesn't undermine the pro-
emotion consensus. But this paper is also telling of a more general lesson, namely we need 
to be much clearer when we employ concepts of cognitive science to inform a philosophy 
of emotion.
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